Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10751
Authors: Georg Noldeke; Jorge Peña
Abstract: We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results confirm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.
Keywords: Costly Voting; Mixed Strategy Equilibrium; Participation Games; Polynomials in Bernstein Form
JEL Codes: C72; D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| participation costs (D23) | number of totally mixed symmetric equilibria (C62) |
| size of the electorate (K16) | number of totally mixed symmetric equilibria (C62) |
| size of the electorate (K16) | voting probability in low turnout equilibrium (D72) |
| size of the electorate (K16) | voting probability in high turnout equilibrium (D72) |
| participation costs (D23) | voting probability in low turnout equilibrium (D72) |
| participation costs (D23) | voting probability in high turnout equilibrium (D72) |