Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10620
Authors: Yuriy Gorodnichenko; Bohdan Kukharskyy; Grard Roland
Abstract: This paper develops a model of global sourcing with culturally dissimilar countries. Production of final goods requires the coordination of decisions between the headquarter of a multinational firm and managers of their component suppliers. Managers of both units are assumed to have strong beliefs about the right course of action and are reluctant to adjust their decisions. We characterize the optimal allocation of decision rights across firms when contracts are incomplete. Our theoretical model delivers two key predictions: the incentive of a firm to integrate (rather than outsource) its input supply is decreasing in the cultural distance between the home and the host country and decreasing in trade costs between the two countries. Combining data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Related Party Trade with various measures for cultural distance and trade cost, we find empirical evidence strongly supportive of these two predictions.
Keywords: cultural distance; global sourcing; organization of multinational firms; property rights; vertical integration
JEL Codes: F14; F23; P14; Z1
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Integration of suppliers (L14) | Quality of final goods (L15) |
| Productivity (O49) | Integration of suppliers (L14) |
| Trade costs (F19) | Integration of suppliers (L14) |
| Cultural distance (Z10) | Integration of suppliers (L14) |