Debt Bias in Corporate Income Taxation and the Costs of Banking Crises

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10616

Authors: Sven Langedijk; Gaetan Nicodeme; Andrea Pagano; Alessandro Rossi

Abstract: Corporate income taxation (CIT) in most countries favors debt over equity financing, leading to over-indebtedness. This problem is particularly acute for the financial sector. We estimate financial-stability benefits of eliminating this debt bias. We estimate the long-run effects of CIT on bank leverage and, using a Vasicek-based model of banking crisis losses, we find that eliminating this debt bias could reduce public finance losses in the range of 30 to 70%. These results hold even for conservative estimates of bank-leverage and portfolio-risk effects of CIT changes.

Keywords: Capital Structure; Debt Bias; Public Finance; Systemic Risk; Taxation

JEL Codes: G01; G28; G32; H25


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Elimination of Debt Bias (H69)Reduction in Public Finance Losses during Banking Crises (F65)
Regulatory Requirements and Market Conditions (G18)Bank Leverage (G21)
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) (H25)Bank Leverage (G21)
Higher Corporate Income Tax (CIT) (H29)Increased Bank Leverage (F65)
Tax Incentives Favoring Debt Financing (H20)Increased Bank Leverage (F65)
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) (H25)Over-Indebtedness in the Banking Sector (F65)

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