Fiscal Targets: A Guide to Forecasters

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10553

Authors: Joan Paredes; Javier J. Pérez; Gabriel Pérez-Quiros

Abstract: Should rational agents take into consideration government policy announcements? A skilled agent (an econometrician) could set up a model to combine the following two pieces of information in order to anticipate the future course of fiscal policy in real-time: (i) the ex-ante path of policy as published/announced by the government; (ii) incoming, observed data on the actual degree of implementation of ongoing plans. We formulate and estimate empirical models for a number of EU countries (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) to show that government (consumption) targets convey useful information about ex-post policy developments when policy changes significantly (even if past credibility is low) and when there is limited information about the implementation of plans (e.g. at the beginning of a fiscal year). In addition, our models are instrumental to unveil the current course of policy in real-time. Our approach complements a well-established branch of the literature that finds politically-motivated biases in policy targets.

Keywords: Fiscal Policy; Forecasting; Policy Credibility

JEL Codes: C54; E61; E62; H30; H68


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
government consumption targets (E20)actual fiscal policy outcomes (E62)
political biases (D72)effectiveness of government consumption targets in predicting policy outcomes (E61)
credibility of government plans (H12)effectiveness of government consumption targets in predicting policy outcomes (E61)
historical credibility of government plans (E65)insights into future course of fiscal policy (E62)

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