Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10481
Authors: Laurent Bouton; Micael Castanheira; Aniol Llorentesaguer
Abstract: The rational-voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duverger's law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an assumption in those models: the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. In this paper, we propose the first direct empirical evidence of the effect of aggregate uncertainty in multicandidate elections. Adopting a theory-based experimental approach, we explore whether aggregate uncertainty indeed favors the emergence of non-Duverger's law equilibria in plurality elections. Our experimental results support the main theoretical predictions: sincere voting is a predominant strategy under aggregate uncertainty, whereas without aggregate uncertainty, voters massively coordinate their votes behind one candidate, who wins almost surely.
Keywords: aggregate uncertainty; experiments; multicandidate elections; plurality; rational voter model
JEL Codes: C92; D70
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| aggregate uncertainty (E10) | sincere voting (K16) |
| no aggregate uncertainty (D89) | strategic voting behind a single candidate (D79) |
| aggregate uncertainty (E10) | emergence of non-Duverger's law equilibria (D72) |
| no aggregate uncertainty (D89) | Duverger's law equilibrium (C62) |