Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10422
Authors: Andrés Rodríguez-Pose; Yannis Psycharis; Vassilis Tselios
Abstract: This paper discusses how electoral politics shapes the regional allocation of public investment expenditures per capita in Greece. Using regional public investment data for 10 political periods (1975-2009), combined with electoral data by constituency, a model is proposed which captures the influence of politics on the regional distribution of public investment expenditures. The results of the analysis point to a strong relationship between electoral results and regional public investment spending. Greek governing parties have tended to reward those constituencies returning them to office. Moreover, an increase in both the absolute and relative electoral returns of the governing party in a region has traditionally been followed by greater public investment per capita in that region. Regions where the governing party (whether Liberal or Socialist) has held a monopoly of seats have been the greatest beneficiaries of this type of pork-barrel politics.
Keywords: Elections; Greece; Political Geography; Pork-Barrel Politics; Public Investment
JEL Codes: H50; H77; R12; R58; Z18
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| governing party orientation (liberal party) (P16) | public investment expenditures per capita (H54) |
| length of political periods (reelected governments) (D72) | public investment decisions (H54) |
| political power of governing party (absolute and relative) (D72) | allocation of public investment expenditures (H54) |
| geographical allocation of public investments (H54) | governing party orientation (D72) |
| GDP per capita (O49) | public investment allocation (H54) |