Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10405
Authors: Gilat Levy; Ronny Razin
Abstract: In this paper we question the common wisdom that more polarized voters? opinions imply larger policy polarization. We analyze a voting model in which the source of the polarization in voters? opinions is ?correlation neglect?, that is, voters neglect the correlation in their information sources. Our main result shows that such polarization in opinions does not necessarily translate to policy polarization; when the electoral system is not too competitive (that is, when there is some aggregate noise in the election?s outcome), then voters with correlation neglect may induce lower levels of policy polarization compared with rational electorates.
Keywords: correlation neglect; polarization; policy polarization; public opinion
JEL Codes: D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Voter polarization due to correlation neglect (D79) | Policy polarization (D72) |
| Behavioral voters (D91) | Lower levels of policy polarization (H19) |
| Increased voter polarization (D72) | Greater policy polarization (D72) |
| Increased voter polarization (D72) | More informed voting (K16) |
| More informed voting (K16) | Probability of winning for political candidates (D79) |
| Lower polarization in platforms (F12) | Higher welfare in behavioral electorates (D79) |