Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10348
Authors: Michael Knig; Dominic Rohner; Mathias Thoenig; Fabrizio Zilibotti
Abstract: We study from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective how a network of military alliances and enmities affects the intensity of a conflict. The model combines elements from network theory and from the politico-economic theory of conflict. We postulate a Tullock contest success function augmented by an externality: each group?s strength is increased by the fighting effort of its allies, and weakened by the fighting effort of its rivals. We obtain a closed form characterization of the Nash equilibrium of the fighting game, and of how the network structure affects individual and total fighting efforts. We then perform an empirical analysis using data on the Second Congo War, a conflict that involves many groups in a complex network of informal alliances and rivalries. We estimate the fighting externalities, and use these to infer the extent to which the conflict intensity can be reduced through (i) removing individual groups involved in the conflict; (ii) pacification policies aimed at alleviating animosity among groups.
Keywords: Africa; alliances; civil conflict; Congo War; contest success function; enmities; network; rainfall
JEL Codes: C36; C72; D74; D85; F51
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| fighting effort of a group (D70) | total fighting efforts of enemies (H56) |
| fighting effort of a group (D70) | total fighting efforts of allies (H56) |
| total fighting efforts of enemies (H56) | fighting effort of a group (D70) |
| total fighting efforts of allies (H56) | fighting effort of a group (D70) |