Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP1033
Authors: Mika Widgren
Abstract: We examine national effects on the common policies of the European Union (EU). The paper establishes a difference between national influence on voting outcomes and policies. It is assumed that policies of the EU are public goods and Holler's public good power index is applied. The method is extended to cover voting games with coalitions to reveal also the effects of cooperation on policies. We show that small countries have more influence on common policies of the EU than on voting outcomes. Coalition formation can, however, ruin this since even coalitions smaller than the blocking minority can control policy.
Keywords: European Union; Cooperative Game Theory; Voting Power
JEL Codes: C71; D70; F02
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| small countries (O52) | policy impact (D78) |
| coalition formation (C71) | distribution of policy power (H77) |
| largest countries (O57) | voting outcomes (D72) |
| coalition formation (C71) | distribution of power and influence (D30) |
| coalition power (C71) | policy control (E64) |