Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10274
Authors: Alex Krumer; Reut Megidish; Aner Sela
Abstract: We study round-robin tournaments with one prize and four symmetric players. There are three rounds, each of which includes two sequential matches where each player plays against a different opponent in every round. Each pair-wise match is modelled as an all-pay auction. We characterize the sub-game perfect equilibrium and show that a player who plays in the first match of each of the first two rounds has a first-mover advantage as reflected by a significantly higher winning probability as well as a significantly higher expected payoff than his opponents. Therefore, if the contest designer wishes to sustain the fair play principle he has to schedule all the matches in each round at the same time in order to obstruct a meaningful advantage to one of the players.
Keywords: All-Pay Contests; Round-Robin Tournaments
JEL Codes: D44; O31
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| First match player in first two rounds (C78) | Higher probability of winning (D44) |
| First match player in first two rounds (C78) | Higher expected payoff (G40) |
| First match player wins initial matches (C72) | Discourages subsequent players (C72) |
| Discouragement of subsequent players (C73) | Decrease in their efforts (D29) |
| Decrease in efforts of subsequent players (C73) | Asymmetry in winning probabilities (C72) |
| Order of matches in last round (C78) | Winning probabilities (C69) |
| Order of matches in last round (C78) | Expected payoffs (G19) |