Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10228
Authors: Luca Flabbi; Mario Macis; Andrea Moro; Fabiano Schivardi
Abstract: We analyze a matched employer-employee panel data set and find that female leadership has a positive effect on female wages at the top of the distribution, and a negative one at the bottom. Moreover, performance in firms with female leadership increases with the share of female workers. This evidence is consistent with a model where female executives are better equipped at interpreting signals of productivity from female workers. This suggests substantial costs of under-representation of women at the top: for example, if women became CEOs of firms with at least 20% female employment, sales per worker would increase 6.7%.
Keywords: executives; gender; firm performance; gender gap; glass ceiling; statistical discrimination
JEL Codes: J16; J7; M12; M5
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| female CEOs (M12) | better interpretation of productivity signals from female workers (J29) |
| better interpretation of productivity signals from female workers (J29) | wage adjustments for high-performing women (J31) |
| better interpretation of productivity signals from female workers (J29) | wage adjustments for low-performing women (J31) |
| female leadership (J16) | female wages at the top of the wage distribution (J31) |
| female leadership (J16) | female wages at the bottom of the wage distribution (J31) |
| share of female workers (J21) | firm performance (L25) |
| female CEOs (M12) | increased wage dispersion among female wages (J31) |