Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10171
Authors: hlne bourguignon; renato gomes; jean tirole
Abstract: The proliferation of new payment methods on the Internet rekindles the old and unsettled debate about merchants? incentive and ability to differentiate price according to payment choice. This paper develops an imperfect-information framework for the analysis of platform and social regulation of card surcharging and cash discounting. It makes three main contributions. First, it identifies the conditions under which concerns about missed sales induce merchants to perceive that they must take the card. Second, it derives a set of predictions about cash discounts, card surcharges and platform fees that match, and shed light on existing evidence. Finally, it shows that the optimal regulation of surcharging is related to public policy toward merchant fees and substantially differs from current practice.
Keywords: card surcharges; cash discounts; holdups in two-sided markets; missed sales; payment cards
JEL Codes: D83; L10; L41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| missed sales (L14) | accept card payments (E40) |
| absence of surcharging regulations (G18) | accept high merchant fees (D49) |
| optimal regulation of surcharging (G18) | market outcomes (P42) |
| allowing surcharges (R48) | enhance welfare (I30) |