Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10158
Authors: Alessandra Casella; Sébastien Turban; Gregory Wawro
Abstract: We model a procedural reform aimed at restoring a proper role for the minority in the confirmation process of judicial nominations in the U.S. Senate. We propose that nominations to the same level court be collected in periodic lists and voted upon individually with Storable Votes, allowing each senator to allocate freely a fixed number of total votes. Although each nomination is decided by simple majority, storable votes make it possible for the minority to win occasionally, but only when the relative importance its members assign to a nomination is higher than the relative importance assigned by the majority. Numerical simulations, motivated by a game theoretic model, show that under plausible assumptions a minority of 45 senators would be able to block between 20 and 35 percent of nominees. For most parameter values, the possibility of minority victories increases aggregate welfare.
Keywords: filibuster; judiciary; senate; storable votes; voting
JEL Codes: D72; H11; K4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| introduction of storable votes (D72) | minority of 45 senators can block between 20% and 35% of judicial nominees (D72) |
| higher correlation of voting intensities within a party (D79) | more successful minority blocks (J15) |
| minority victories (J15) | increase aggregate welfare (D69) |
| minority's preferences stronger than majority's (D79) | minority can occasionally prevail (J15) |
| strategic manipulation of the slate of nominees (D72) | affect likelihood of minority victories (K16) |
| storable votes (D72) | enhance procedural rights of the minority (D72) |
| storable votes (D72) | maintain majority's ability to govern (D72) |
| storable votes (D72) | foster a more equitable and efficient confirmation process (D72) |