Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10084
Authors: Daniele Checchi; Gianni De Fraja; Stefano Verzillo
Abstract: We derive a theoretical model of effort in the presence of career concern based on the multi-unit all-pay auction, and closely inspired by the Italian academic market. In this model, the number of applicants, the number of new posts, and the relative importance of the determinants of promotion determine academics' effort. Because of the specific characteristics of Italian universities, where incentives operate only through promotion, and where all appointment panels are drawn from strictly separated and relatively narrow scientific sectors, the model fits well Italian academia, and we test it in a newly constructed dataset which collects the journal publications of all Italian academics working in universities. We find that individual researchers respond to incentives in the manner predicted by the theoretical model: more capable researchers respond to increases in the importance of the measurable determinants of promotion and in the competitiveness of the scientific sector by exerting more effort; less able researchers do the opposite.
Keywords: academic job market; applied auction theory; career concerns; nepotism; publications
JEL Codes: D44; I21; I23; M51
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| increases in the importance of measurable determinants of promotion (M51) | exerting more effort (D29) |
| increases in the competitiveness of their scientific sector (O39) | exerting more effort (D29) |
| more capable researchers (D29) | exerting more effort in response to heightened competition and promotion importance (M51) |
| less able researchers (D29) | exerting less effort under similar conditions (D29) |