Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP10073
Authors: Roberto Bonfatti; Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke
Abstract: Existing theories of pre-emptive war typically predict that the leading country may choose to launch a war on a follower who is catching up, since the follower cannot credibly commit to not use their increased power in the future. But it was Japan who launched a war against the West in 1941, not the West that pre-emptively attacked Japan. Similarly, many have argued that trade makes war less likely, yet World War I erupted at a time of unprecedented globalization. This paper develops a theoretical model of the relationship between trade and war which can help to explain both these observations. Dependence on strategic imports can lead follower nations to launch pre-emptive wars when they are potentially subject to blockade.
Keywords: Blockade; History; Trade and War
JEL Codes: F51; F52; N70
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Increased import dependence (F69) | Initiation of preemptive wars (F51) |
| Vulnerability to blockade (D74) | Initiation of preemptive wars (F51) |
| Increased import dependence + Vulnerability to blockade (F52) | Initiation of preemptive wars (F51) |